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Introduction: Purpose of Post-Election Violence Survey
1.

The post-election violence (PEV) survey supports numerous purposes with respect
towards measuring progress in the implementation of the Kenya National Dialogue and
Reconciliation (KNDR) agreements. While objective measures of the implementation of
specific agenda items may be gathered without a survey, the proper use of a survey
instrument allows researchers and policymakers to gather data on the perception of
progress towards implementation that may or may not correlate with actual
implementation.

2.

Specifically, the PEV survey allows us to further probe progress on important elements of
the KNDR process with respect to those areas most affected by post-election violence.
Besides the immediate effects of violence, these areas may suffer from political divisions,
a lack of economic progress, and problems of social cohesion more so than in areas not
directly affected by fighting. A survey targeted in these areas allows us to easily identify
the main problems around healing and reconciliation and therefore progress towards
national cohesion.

3.

The benefit of this particular survey comes from our use of open-ended questions to
better gauge the problems, progress, and solutions advocated by the general public with
respect to the KNDR agreement. The survey has focused more on what residents thought
the sources of problems were and their ideas on how to solve them. Moreover, the survey
design includes a special sampling procedure aimed to target IDPs (see below), as well as
an additional battery of questions about the situation in IDP camps.

Survey Design and Field Work
Design
4.

South Consulting produced the survey instrument, supervised field work, and performed
data analysis. A private research firm performed field work and helped in questionnaire
production using Formic software as well as automatic data capture.

5.

Prior to finalizing the survey, a pilot survey was undertaken on 28 February and 1-3
March in Nairobi, Kericho, and Molo. The purpose of the pilot was to field test the
questionnaire, including question wording and ordering, allowing feedback from
respondents to interviewers on the ease of answering questions but also feedback from
interviewers on problems with administering them.

Fieldwork recruitment and training process
6.

The fieldwork team comprised a coordinator, supervisors and interviewers. South
oversaw the entire fieldwork process. This included ensuring that the supervisors had the
correct sampling distribution list as well as the correct number of the questionnaires as
per the required distribution and the regions where each supervisor worked.

7.

The field supervisors were in charge of certain number of districts and were tasked to
accompany interviewers and make sure that they follow the proper respondent selection
and interviewing procedures, edit questionnaires for completeness in the field, execute
quality control procedures including conducting mandatory back checks, compiling field
reports and daily progress updates, plan the interviewing schedules, and maintain
fieldwork discipline. Interviewers were responsible for conducting the actual survey,
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following the proper selection procedures by randomly selecting households and
respondents via Kish Grid and continuing with the survey if the respondent agrees.
8.

In addition, South Consulting hired the services of at least 10 field supervisors to
complement the efforts of the Steadman Group in the field exercise. The main task of
these supervisors was to audit the field exercise and ensure that the fieldwork was
implemented as designed. During the fieldwork, the South Supervisors witnessed some
of the interviews as well as performing back-checks.

Pre-test and Actual Fieldwork
9.

The fieldwork exercise was preceded by a pilot study carried out between February 28th
2009 and March 2nd 2009. The pre-test was done in Nairobi, Kipkelion and Molo.
Nairobi and Kipkelion were selected for the pre-test due to their urban and rural
characteristics respectively. Molo was selected for the pre-test so as to test the study tool
among the internally displaced persons. However, each of these regions experienced PEV
although in varying degree of magnitude. Actual fieldwork began on 7 March 2009 and
continued until completion on 14 March 2009. The fieldwork commenced in all areas
concurrently.

Field Quality Control Procedures
10.

During fieldwork, the survey teams conducted interviews in either English or Kiswahili
depending on the language respondents preferred. This was done to ensure the
respondents were at ease all through the interviewing process.

11.

The supervisors ensured that they checked 100% of the questionnaires on a daily basis
for completeness. Any questionnaire found to have incomplete details was referred back
to the field the following day for corrections.

12.

The project coordinator and supervisors accompanied over 11% of the interviews. This
ensured that interviewers follow instructions. In total, each interviewer was
accompanied at least 3 times during fieldwork. Supervisors also back-checked 20% of the
interviews to ensure proper conduct of fieldwork and prevent shirking.

Sampling Methodology
13.

The survey is designed to achieve a sample of 1,500 Kenyans aged 18 and over in areas
affected by PEV (producing a 95% confidence level and a sampling error of +/- 2.47%). It
is important that strict scientific sampling guidelines, including randomization, are
always followed so that the sample drawn is an accurate reflection of the population at
large. Any attempts at “purposeful selection” are avoided to prevent unscientific
conclusions.

14.

The survey relied upon multi-stage cluster sampling using the 1999 National Population
and Housing Census as the sampling frame. First, 1,500 interviews were proportionally
allocated to all of the districts affected by post-election violence, as identified in the Waki
Report, the Ministry of Special Programs and the international humanitarian
intervention ‘hubs’ and coordination clusters. This included areas in Nairobi, Central,
Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western provinces. If a district recorded incidences of PEV, we
included it in the sample. If districts did not, they were excluded. As such, enumeration
occurred in twenty-six districts, following the district names and boundaries that were in
place during the post-election and reflect those in the census (although some areas of
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Mombasa district did experience violence, we decided to perform focus groups there
given the highly concentrated and localized form of violence in that district).
15.

Within each district, there was further allocated samples to randomly selected
enumeration areas (sub-locations). This yielded 150 enumeration areas across the
twenty-six districts. Interviewers travelled to those enumeration areas and began
household selection from local sampling points. This method was also used for
enumeration areas that were IDP camps, where tent structures were considered
households.

16.

Once households were selected, interviewers approached the first person they saw at the
house and then proceed to randomly select respondents using the Kish Grid, a
standardized tool for household selection. This method applied for respondents chosen
from tent structures in IDP camps as well. There were no age, gender, or other
purposeful quotas attempted—all respondents were randomly chosen. The interviewers
then used the last digit of the serial number on the questionnaire to select the
respondent to be interviewed (only members of the household 18 years and older are
listed in the Kish Grid). In instances where the selected respondent was not available at
the time of call, three call backs were made in an attempt to find the respondent.

17.

In addition to the sample of 1,500 respondents in PEV areas, we also conducted 200
interviews in IDP camps, where we administered the same battery of questions as the
larger sample, but also questions dealing in particular with issues faced by IDPs and the
condition of life in the camps. These included 11 camps in Rift Valley. Similar procedures
of random selection of living structures inside of camps and respondents follow the
household and respondent selection described above. See Annex for the sampling
distributions.

Data Management (Postfieldwork)
18.

The South Consulting team oversaw the process of data management. During the data
processing exercise, following best practice, South’s supervisor randomly validated at
least 10% (170 questionnaires) and Steadman’s supervisor randomly validated at least
15% of the questionnaires. Overall, South closely checked the process to ensure that valid
data was captured. The data was then exported to SPSS for further cleaning, validation
and analysis. The analysis was then handed over to the south research officers for report
writing.

Questionnaire Design
19.

The questionnaire included two important components. The first involved questions
regarding the four agenda areas, with particular reference to how respondents perceive
the source and solution to immediate and long-standing issues addressed by the
National Accord. In particular, this included the use of multiple open-ended questions to
allow for more in-depth responses that were coded and aggregated in post-fieldwork
analysis. The second involved questions for IDPs specifically, especially considering the
conditions in camps.
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Demographic Profile of Survey
20.

Table 1 presents the demographic profile of the PEV survey. Notice that these
proportions do not necessarily represent the Kenyan population generally because the
survey is limited to PEV areas only.

Table 1: Demographic Profile
Setting
Rural
Urban
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18 - 25 yrs
26 - 30 yrs
31 - 35 yrs
36 - 40 yrs
41 - 45 yrs
46 - 50 yrs
51 - 55 yrs
56 - 60 yrs
61+ yrs
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Muslim
Other
Traditional
Rta

92%
8%
50%
50%
29%
19%
12%
12%
7%
7%
4%
4%
6%
62%
26%
1%
8%
<1%
1%

Highest level of education
No formal schooling
Primary education
Secondary school education
Post secondary college education
University education

8%
43%
38%
9%
2%

Employment
Casual/piece jobs
Working full-time
Working part-time

10%
27%
14%

Pensioner
Unemployed
Housewife taking care of home full-time
Other (Unspecified)
Student

2%
33%
11%
1%
2%

Ethnic Community
Kalenjin
Luhya
Kikuyu
Luo
Kisii
Maasai
Other

27%
23%
19%
13%
9%
4%
5%
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Key Findings
Agenda Item 1: Immediate Action to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental
Rights and Liberties

Violence
21.

An immediate concern for Kenyan citizens involves the propensity for violence,
especially given recent challenges facing the working of the Coalition government and
the fact that national level political conflicts tend to trickle to the local level where they
heighten animosity between groups. Chart 1 shows that despite ongoing issues, only
about a quarter of respondents (26%) in areas affected by post-election violence (PEV)
think that violence will occur in their area in the twelve months, whereas 63% did not
think so and 11% remained unsure. Given that the survey was limited to PEV areas, this
result might provide an encouraging sign that those most affected by post-election
violence remain sceptical about future violence. However, events could easily change
this, especially because of lack of cohesion within the Coalition.
Chart 1: Do you think violence is likely to occur in this area in the next twelve months?

22.

For those who answered that they did think violence would occur in their areas in the
coming year, we asked a follow-up open-ended question probing their reasons for saying
that they thought violence would occur. A plurality attributes the potential for future to
violence to “fighting within government” (28%). Moreover, 7% thought political
incitement and 7% thought differences between political parties could contribute to
violence. Further responses show the importance of governance: 4% blame a lack of
justice, 4% corruption, and 3% leader who will not fulfil promises. Taken together, a
majority of 53% blame some aspect of poor government. This demonstrates the
perceived relationship between the ability of the Coalition to work together and levels of
violence in the eyes of the public.

23.

Other responses focused on more social problems at the community level. 11% replied
that tribalism would produce violence; while 5% felt the same way about tension, and 4%
disagreements in the community. 24% provided other responses.

6

Table 2: Why do you think violence will occur?
Fighting within government
Tribalism
Political incitement
Differences between political parties
Tension
Lack of justice
Disagreements in the community
Corruption
Leaders will not fulfill promises
To create more jobs
Other

28%
11%
7%
7%
5%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
24%

24.

To the same population who answered that they believed violence could occur, we asked
them who they think would be responsible for such acts. The most popular responses
were politicians (33%), political supporters (27%), members of rival ethnic groups (19%),
gangs (8%), militias (5%), and the police (4%). 5% replied “other.” Aggregating the
responses on politicians and political supporters leaves 60% who attribute potential
violence to political actors, once again underscoring the importance of good governance
towards the promotion of peace.

25.

Similarly, we asked those who replied that they did not think violence would recur why
they thought so. 40% replied that there was peace in their region, 17% believe people
have learned that violence does not help, 11% say their areas contain members of the
same tribe or that their area lacks tribalism, and 5% mention that members of their
community are concentrated on development and not fighting. 24% provided other
responses and 4% refused to answer.

26.

We asked all respondents the best ways they think to prevent violence are in Kenya. We
allowed for up to three responses and present aggregated results.
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Graph 1: What are the most important ways to prevent future violence in Kenya?

2%

Other

7%

Land reform

10%

Fighting poverty

11%

Stop incitement by politicians
Prosecution

12%

Fighting unemployment

12%

Reconciliation

12%
15%

Free and fair elections

19%

Fighting Tribalism
0%

27.

5%

10%

15%

20%

While a plurality believe that fighting tribalism is the best way to prevent violence (19%),
additional responses relate directly to aspects of the Agenda items specified in the KNDR
agreement. 15% believe conducing free and fair elections is key to curtailing violence,
while 12% think that reconciliation is important, as well as fighting unemployment (12%)
and prosecuting those who are guilty for crimes (12%). Similarly, 11% believe stopping
incitement by politicians remains imperative, along with fighting poverty (10%) and land
reform (7%). 2% provided other responses.

Militias
28.

We asked whether there had been local organised armed groups who committed acts of
post-election violence in the respondents’ area, and found that only 18% of the sample
replied “yes.” 80% said “no” while 2% were unsure. Because the survey was conducted in
PEV areas only, this suggests that the presence of militias may be much smaller than the
problem of violence more generally, at least as the public perceives the existence of
militias. Of those who replied that there had been militias operating in their area, only
43% reply that they have been disbanded, while 46% say they have not and 11% remain
unsure. Thus, while limited even within PEV areas, the threat from militias does remain.

29.

Graph 2 shows aggregated responses from an open-ended question that allowed the subsample of people who responded “no” to the question on whether militias had been
demobilized in their area to provide their reasons for why they think militias have not
been disbanded.
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Graph 2: Why do you think these groups have not

been disbanded or demobilized in your

area?

Don’t know

2%

They change tactics

7%

They are not well organized

7%

Police incompetence

25%

Politicians support/finance

27

No government commitment
30.

The results do not bode well for perceptions of how well the Coalition government is
performing in addressing the problem of militias. Nearly a third do not believe the
government is at all committed to addressing the problem of militias (32%), while
another 27% blame politicians for supporting and/or financing them. 25% blame police
incompetence in trying to arrest militia members, while 7% blame the structure of
militias themselves as the reason they continue to thrive. 2% do not know.
Table 3 reveals how Kenyans in PEV areas believe that militias ought to be dealt with.
Table 3: What is the best way to disband and demobilize armed groups in Kenya?

Prosecute their leaders and members
Opening dialogue with groups
Increase security by hiring more personnel
Educating the community
Increased searches for illegal weapons
Preaching peace and reconciliation
Government to disband militias
Stop their sponsors
Don’t Know
Other
31.

24%
11%
11%
7%
6%
4%
4%
4%
4%
25%

Results from Table 3 provide strong recommendations for the Coalition government
towards ending militias and thereby providing population protection of citizens. First
and foremost, Kenyans most affected by the violence agree that militia leaders and
members ought to be prosecuted (24%), followed by those who believe in opening up
dialogue (11%) and hiring more security personnel (11%). 7% think the educating the
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community is required, while 6% want stronger police work in the search for illegal
weapons that are used by militias. Preaching peace and reconciliation (4%), government
disbanding militias (4%), and stopping sponsors (4%) also remain important for the
public. 4% don’t know, and 25% provided other responses.
32.

When asked who they think finances militias, respondents in PEV areas provide an even
more critical of the government. 37% blame politicians, 13% blame political parties, and
10% blame the government. Taken together, 60% of responses declare Kenyan political
actors as the financiers of militia violence. 11% attribute responsibility to business
people, while 8% say ordinary citizens and 7% community elders. 10% don’t know, 4%
provided other responses, while 1% refused to answer.

Fundamental Freedoms
33.

Chart 2 shows the lack of public confidence in the government’s reaction to public
demonstrations.

Chart 2: Do you think the government’s response to public demonstrations today is likely to be
forceful/violent or not likely to be forceful/violent?

Don't Know
9%

Violent
58%
Not Violent
33%

34.

Data from this question show a clear lack of faith amongst respondents that the
government will act appropriately and refrain from violence during public
demonstrations. 58% believe the government will use force against people in
demonstrations, showing a clear curtailment of the freedom to assemble.

10

Agenda Item 2: Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis, Promoting Healing
and Reconciliation
35.

One potential concern for residents in PEV areas is the existence and location of
Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs). While the Coalition government claims that all
camps have been closed and members relocated, this is in fact not the case; some IDPs
have relocated to ‘transit camps’ while a few camps are still in place and have IDPs who
have declined to move out. Without government protection, and an effective
resettlement programme, IDPs remain vunerable and hostilities between IDPs and other
community members may exacerbate conflict and serve to undermine progress on
various agenda items.

36.

In this section, we begin by presenting evidence about perceptions of IDPs from the PEV
public, and then present results from IDPs specifically.

Perceptions of IDPs
37.

When asked if there were any people displaced from their homes in the areas inhabited
by the respondents, 30% of those sampled in PEV areas replied “yes.” Of those who
replied yes, we asked a follow-up question as to whether IDPs had been resettled in that
area, stay in IDP camps, or have relocated to other areas. 63% reply that they have
mostly been resettled, 6% remain mostly in IDP camps, and 26% relocated to other
areas. 2% don’t know and 2% refused to answer.

38.

For those who replied “mostly resettled in this area,” we asked what the respondents
thought was the most important concern for IDPs that have been resettled locally.
Table 4: What do you think is the most important concern for IDPs who have been
resettled in this area?

Food
Livelihood
Security
Healing and reconciliation
Shelter
Land
Other
Refused to answer
Don’t know

40%
14%
13%
9%
8%
7%
2%
6%
1%

39.

Table 4 makes clear the needs of IDPs who have been resettled as perceived by members
of those communities. A large plurality perceive food as the most important concern
(40%), followed by livelihood (14%) and security (13%). Thus, “bread and butter” issues
of basic living and survival remain important.

40.

While post-election violence produced nearly 600,000 IDPs, their status remains
controversial. The government denies their existence, claiming that all IDP camps have
been closed. Moreover, the degree to which IDPs have been re-integrated into their own
communities or been pushed to other communities remains contentious and
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problematic. Additionally, there are some perceptions amongst the public that non-IDPs
might be posing as such in order to access government funds.
41.

To gauge potential levels of hostility towards IDPs, we asked what respodents thought
was the most important reason IDPs remain in camps. The answers we provided were 1)
“fear of attacks if they go home” 2) “awaiting government funds” 3) “they lack land to go
to” or 4) “do you think IDPs are not genuine.” Chart 3 presents these results.

Chart 3: What is the most important reasons IDPs remain in camps?

Don’t Know
3%
IDPs aren't
genuine
6%

Refused to
answer
Other 2%
2%

Fear of
attacks
39%

They lack
land
23%

Awaiting
funds
25%

42.

In general, the results from Chart 3 show that by and large, the public is attuned to the
needs of IDPs that remain in camps. Rather than assert that these IDPs are false and
simply posing as such to access government services (6%), a large plurality believe that
the IDPs fear for their safety (42%), are awaiting government funds (27%), or lack land
to return to (25%). 3% don’t know, 2% had other responses, and 2% refused to answer.
The public in PEV areas thus remain sensitive to the needs of IDPs in camps.

43.

Table 5 shows how people think the government can address the problem of IDPs. Once
again, this question was asked of the entire PEV sample, not just IDPs, so its results
demonstrated the perceptions of the population living in PEV areas, but not necessarily
IDPs themselves.
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Table 5: What is the most important thing the government can do to address the problem of

people displaced by post-election violence in Kenya?
Give financial assistance
Resettle them here
Take them back to their ancestral districts
Promoting peace and reconciliation
Increase security
Other
Don’t know
Refused to answer
44.

37%
17%
15%
10%
9%
8%
2%
2%

By and large, the public in PEV areas remain supportive of IDPs, saying that the
government should give them financial assistance (37%), resettle them locally (17%),
promote peace and reconciliation (10%) and increase security (9%). However, results
from this question show some level of antagonism towards IDPs, as 15% think the
government should take them back to their ancestral districts. This demonstrates a
level—albeit small—of tension between some IDPs and other people within PEV areas.
8% of respondents provide other responses, while 2% don’t know and 2% refused to
answer.
Graph 3 shows a subsequent question that allows us to gain better leverage on the
perceived relationship between the public and IDPs.
Graph 3: What is the nature of the relationship

between IDPs and the other people in your

area?

45.

Graph 3 also supports the general view that IDPs and others generally get along (43%),
but with low levels of tension (16%), threats (1%), or fighting (<1%). 12% don’t know and
1% refused to answer. For 27% of respondents, the question was not applicable.
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IDP Survey
46.

As explained in the methodology section above, we include on the survey a special
section for IDP respondents. 72 of these respondents appeared in the normal survey
sample (N=1,500) through normal selection procedure; we also sampled 200 IDPs from
IDP camps. We present the data from questions that were asked specifically to these
IDPs but not others. We include responses from the 72 IDPs in the normal sample and
the 200 IDPs in the IDP sample.
Table 6: In the last three months, did any of the following give you assistance?

IDP
Sample
Government
Kenya Red Cross
NGOs
Religious groups
UNHCR
Individuals
Private Sector

Yes
24%
75%
35%
56%
38%
47%
21%

Normal
Sample
No
67%
20%
55%
36%
51%
44%
64%

RTA
9%
5%
10%
8%
11%
9%
15%

Yes
15%
38%
21%
35%
14%
57%
14%

No
74%
50%
67%
53%
69%
26%
69%

RTA
11%
12%
12%
12%
17%
17%
17%

47.

Table 6 shows that for IDPs still in camps, if they have received assistance, it is most
likely to have come from Kenya Red Cross (75%) or religious groups (56%). IDPs not in
camps are most likely to have received assistance from other individuals (57%) and
Kenya Red Cross (38%).

48.

With respect to funds provided by the government, 83% of IDPs sampled in camps have
received money from the government, while only 21% of IDPs in the normal sample
have. For those IDPS in camps who answered that they have received money; 81% have
received the amount of 10,000 Kshs, 6% have received 25,000 Kshs, and 13% have
received both. 64% report that there were problems with the disbursement of the money.
Conversely for the normal sample, 87% have received 10,000 Kshs, 7% have received
25,000 Kshs, and another 6% have received both. 43% report that there were problems
with disbursement of this money.

49.

Table 7 reports the problems that each sample had with the disbursements. By and large
these relate to the administration of the program, including names missing from lists,
incorrect government records, and inadequate and/or contradictory information. IDPs
also report problems of corruption, including money being given to non-IDPs and
reports of officials asking for bribes.
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Table 7: What were the problems with the disbursement of this money?

IDP Sample
Names missing from lists
Incorrect government records
Money given to non-IDPs
Asked for bribes
Lack of ID documents
Inadequate/contradictory information
Other
50.

Normal Sample

34%
17%
16%
13%
11%
10%
1%

22%
14%
16%
16%
9%
16%
7%

We follow-up by asking both sets of IDPs how they think disbursement can be improved
in Table 8. The results here echo the problems identified above, relating to both the
administration of the program and levels of corruption, where respondents are calling
for better accountability, transparency, and oversight.
Table 8: How do you think the disbursement of money can be improved?

IDP Sample
Transparency through their records
Identify and give money fairly to the genuine IDPs
Avoid corrupt officials
IDPs should be involved
Involvement of a neutral body
None
Involvement of local authorities
They should be given cheques
Accountability through follow ups from the government
Other
51.

Normal
Sample

23%
16%
12%
9%
9%
9%
5%
4%
2%
11%

12%
15%
10%
8%
8%
16%
14%
7%
3%
7%

We asked the IDPs in the camps the most important challenges they face as an IDP, and
allowed for up to three responses. Graph 4 shows what they first responded as the single
most important challenge (the light blue bar), as well as the aggregated responses they
gave for all challenges (the red bar).
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Graph 4: Most important challenges facing IDPs (most important and aggregated responses)

Aggregated

Most Important

31%

Food
Shelter
Livelihood ('mapato')
Land
Healthcare
Education
Security
Other

52.

68%

12% 21%
19%
9%
7%
6%
2%
2%
2% 8%
6%
2%
0% 6%

Unsurprisingly, the concerns of IDPs who remain in camps revolve around basic
necessities, including food and shelter. Table 9 compares responses from the IDPs and
the general public from PEV areas on the most important challenges facing IDPs.
Responses from both mostly accord, demonstrating consensus of both IDPs and nonIDPs about the problems facing IDPs.
Table 9: Comparison of responses from IDPs and PEV public regarding most important
issue facing IDPs

Food
Shelter
Livelihood
Land
Healthcare
Education
Security
Healing and reconciliation
Other
Don’t know
Refused to answer

IDPs
68%
12%
9%
6%
2%
2%
2%
0%
0%
0%
0%

General Public
40%
8%
14%
7%
0%
0%
13%
9%
2%
1%
6%
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Healing and Reconciliation
53.

A majority of Kenyans living in PEV areas report that there have been local activities to
promote healing and reconciliation. 37% say peace meetings, committees, and
workshops have taken place, while another 14% reply religious crusades, 8% awareness
creation, sports and games (7%), counselling services (6%), and women’s initiatives (4%)
occurred. 21% report that no activities have been pursued in their area, while 2% don’t
know and 1% gave other replies.

54.

Kenyans in PEV areas also remain cautiously optimistic about the success of the
promotion of healing and reconciliation among communities in their areas. Chart 4
presents these results.

Chart 4: How successful are the efforts at promoting healing and reconciliation among
communities in your area?

Don’t know
1%
Not
successiful
6%

Refused to
answer
2%

Very
successiful
33%

Somewhat
successiful
58%

55.

The perceptions of Kenyans in the sample show that efforts at reconciliation are making
important progress. However, with 58% saying they are somewhat successful and 6% not
successful, there is room for improvement. 33% think they are very successful, while 1%
aren’t sure and 2% refused to answer. But once again, because the survey is limited to
PEV areas, we expect these locations to have the most difficulty with healing; yet
improvements are being felt by the communities in these places.

56.

We asked a follow-up question regarding what respondents perceive to be the most
important challenges to healing and reconciliation efforts in their areas. 21% reply
“tribalism” while 18% say “mistrust between ethnic groups.” Taken together, this shows
that inter-communal tensions do remain. 15% blame political statements, 13% land
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disputes, 11% no involvement by residents, and 7% criminals who committed acts of
violence are still free. 6% reply that people are too traumatized, 5% don’t know, and 4%
gave other responses. These answers provide important implications for the actions of
the Coalition government in making progress on Agenda Item 2. Problems such as
political incitement and land disputes are at the source of numerous challenges that
remain, including with respect towards the promotion of reconciliation.
57.

Interestingly, Kenyans in PEV areas do not view all political and religious leaders equally
likely towards affecting positive change to promote healing and reconciliation.

Chart 5: Which of the following do you think has the greatest influence at promoting healing
and reconciliation among groups in Kenya?

Politicians
29%

Religious
leaders
48%

NGO s
8%

Provincial
administrati
on
8%
Women's
Groups
2%
Other
4%
Refused to
answer
1%

58.

The results from Chart 5 demonstrate an important point with who the public perceive is
likely to impact the healing and reconciliation efforts. There may be a larger role for civil
society than policy-makers appreciate. A full 58% of the public perceive non-state actors
are likely agents of change, including 48% for religious leaders, 8% for NGOs, and 2% for
women’s groups. Only 37% rely on state actors, including 29% for politicians and 8% for
the provincial administrations. These results could reflect the perceived inefficiencies of
governmental actors towards attempting change, and/or a concomitant perceived
strength attributed to civil society leaders and groups.

59.

Graph 5 gauges the public’s suggestions at promoting reconciliation in their own
communities. We allowed for and then aggregate three open-ended responses.
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Graph 5: Regardless of what has been tried already, please tell me the three best ways to
pursue reconciliation in your community?

60.

Once again, ending tribalism (22%) remains a central concern with respect to healing
and reconciliation. But the results also provide clear guidance for the Coalition
government. More jobs (15%), prosecuting those guilty for PEV (14%), establishing a
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (12%), enacting a land policy (11%),
reducing inequality (9%), and providing more services (8%) all remain important paths
towards promoting healing and reconciliation, and fall under the purview of other
agenda items and require government action. 7% had other responses, while 2% don’t
know.
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Agenda Item 3: Resolving the Political Crisis (Power Sharing)
61.

Given the contested nature of politics in PEV areas, citizens in these locales remain
sensitive to how well the Coalition government shares power, as well as sharing a similar
concern to all Kenyans as to how the government performs.

PowerSharing
62.

Only 21% of the PEV population thinks that they Coalition government works well
together; a full 77% think it does not work well together. 2% is unsure. Table 10 shows
the ways that the public think the Coalition government can work well together.
Table 10: What is the most important thing that the Coalition government can do to
work well together
Unity within political parties
Solve differences
Fight corruption
Focus on the interests of the public
Create more jobs
Renegotiate power-sharing
Reconciliation
Reduce the price of goods
Other
No response

20%
11%
7%
6%
5%
4%
4%
4%
34%
5%

63.

The diversity of responses provided, as well as their relatively low magnitude, suggest
that there is little consensus among the sampled population on the most important thing
the Coalition government can do to work better. A plurality (20%) blames a lack of unity
within political parties. The rest of the responses focus on the ability of the Coalition
members to solve their differences (11%), fight corruption (7%), focus on the interest of
the public (6%), and livelihood issues such as creating more jobs (5%) and reducing the
price of goods (4%). Surprisingly, only 4% mentioned a renegotiation of power-sharing
as the most important component of working better together. 34% gave other responses,
while 5% gave no response.

64.

Residents also remain sceptical about the working relationship between the two main
principals to the Coalition government, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga.
Only 7% of the public in PEV areas are satisfied with the working relationship. 32% are
somewhat satisfied with the relationship, for a combined satisfaction level of 39%. 29%
prove somewhat dissatisfied, while 30% are very dissatisfied for a combined
dissatisfaction level of 59%. 1% don’t know and 1% refused to answer. These findings are
not surprising in light of continued tensions between the two leaders in government,
including the lack of clarification on roles and responsibilities as specified in the
National Accord.

65.

With respect to whether Prime Minister Odinga is exercising his powers of office, 33%
think that yes he is; while 53% say no, he is not and 12% are unsure. 2% refused to
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answer. For those who answered yes or no, we asked a follow-up question as to why
respondents thought so.
Table 11: Why do you think Prime Minister Odinga is/is not exercising his powers of

office?
He has not fulfilled pledges
He has brought development
He has no powers
There are other influential people in the government
Kibaki is still very powerful
He is uniting Kenyans
He supervises government ministries
Reduced Corruption
Other
Don’t know
66.

10%
10%
9%
8%
8%
4%
3%
3%
34%
11%

The large number of “other” categories (34%), in addition to small proportions for all
other answers, demonstrate a low level of agreement with respect to Prime Minister
Odinga’s exercise of powers. Some are willing to blame Odinga, saying “he has not
fulfilled pledges” (10%). Others blame other aspects of the Coalition, saying “he has no
powers” (9%), “there are other influential people in the government” (8%), and “Kibaki is
still very powerful” (8%). Others provide more sanguine views of Odinga’s exercise of
power, mentioning that “he has brought development” (10%), “he is uniting Kenyans”
(4%), “he supervises government ministries” (3%), and “reduced corruption” (3%).

Future of the Coalition Government
67.

While the Coalition government received initial support from much of the Kenyan
public, the population within PEV areas provides perceptions as to how they think
people in their communities will react if the Coalition breaks up before the next election.
The results are not encouraging for stability and achieving peace. 33% comment that
people within their communities will support a break-up, 25% say people will
demonstrate, and 22% say they will attack other communities. These results show at the
very least plurality support for ending the Coalition government, as well as the real
likelihood that such an event would reignite violence. 7% reply that community members
will ask for another general election, while 8% remain unsure. 4% provided other
responses.

Performance of the Police
68.

Given the recent release of information regarding police brutality and extra-judicial
killings, as highlighted in the Waki Report, the report by UN rapporteur Philip Alston,
and ongoing problems between the outlawed Mungiki sect and police; we probed
respondents for their views of recent police performance.
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Graph 6: How do you rate the performance of the police in protecting the rights of Kenyans
within the last three months?

69.

Indeed, citizens remain sensitive to the performance of the police, who are not
performing well. Only 25% gave them a positive rating, with 4% saying “excellent” and
21% “good.” A quarter (26%) replied “just fair” and nearly half, 47%, says “poor.” The
police therefore earned a largely negative (73%) performance rating, suggesting needed
improvements in their ability to provide population security while upholding the law and
maintaining standard of justice. 1% don’t know and 1% refused to answer.
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Agenda Item 4: Long-Standing Issues and Solutions
70.

Given that violence was an outcome from many of the long-standing issues raised by
Agenda Item 4, it is important to measure the views of citizens in PEV areas with respect
to these needed reforms.

Constitutional Revision
71.

The PEV public remains somewhat sceptical that the Coalition government will have
succeeded at making a new constitution for Kenyans by March 2010. Giving a positive
likelihood, 8% say it is “very likely” and 32% “somewhat likely.” Conversely, 31% respond
“somewhat unlikely” and 29% “very unlikely.”

72.

Even more disturbing are evaluations of the efficacy of such a constitution. We asked
whether respondents thought a new constitution will be satisfactory or unsatisfactory in
addressing the needs of Kenyans. The results are not hopeful: 52% reply “unsatisfactory”
while only 34% say “satisfactory.” 14% remain unsure.

73.

We follow this question by asking respondents what they think should be included in a
new constitution to address the needs of most Kenyans (allowing for up to three
responses). Note that this question specifically asks residents to think about the good of
most of the country, not just their own individual or community needs. We present
aggregated responses in Graph 7.
Graph 7: What do you think needs to be included in a new constitution to be satisfactory in
addressing the needs of most Kenyans? (aggregate responses)
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74.

The PEV public provides a host of answers towards what a new constitution ought to
include. First are the goods that citizens would accrue from constitutional reform,
including jobs for the youth (20%), more rights (19%), and the redistribution of
resources (18%). Second are the institutional reforms accompanying a new constitution,
including decreasing presidential power (11%), strengthening parliament (7%), majimbo
(decentralization) (6%), and the creation of a prime minister (4%). 7% don’t know. Taken
together, this suggests respondents desire both direct benefits from a new constitution,
as well as strengthening government by providing for new institutional mechanisms.

75.

Besides asking the sample what they would like to see in a new constitution, we also
asked them to assess what are the most important challenges towards constitutional
reform. The results suggest an important role for the Coalition government and parties
to it at providing robust leadership. Half of respondents (51%) blame politicians who
disagree, while 12% blame divisions within political parties, and 10% divisions within the
Coalition. A further 17% blame problems in society, including 10% who say fighting
between communities and 7% blame differences in opinion among other actors in
society. 5% don’t know, 4% gave other responses, and 1% refused to answer.

Land Reform
76.

The problems over land usage rights and subsequent communal conflict centred on land
remains an important issue particular to PEV locations. Therefore, responses from these
areas about how best to achieve land reform ought to directly inform the path to reform.

Table 12: List three things that the Coalition government must do to address land problems

in your community (aggregate responses)
Enact laws to assist in settling disputes
Distribute land to the landless
Ensure land grabbers have surrendered illegally owned land
Prioritize land allocation to the local community
Allow for both men and women to inherit land
Allow communities only to own land in their ancestral homes
Issue title deeds
Other
Don’t know
77.

24%
23%
20%
11%
7%
5%
4%
4%
2%

The results in Table 12 demonstrate a number of important findings. First, PEV residents
prove particularly sensitive to the discord created from a clear land policy. 24% think
laws must be enacted to settle land disputes and 20% say that land grabbers should be
forced to surrender illegally owned land. Second, respondents by and large a more fair
distribution of land, with 23% wanting distribution to the landless, 11% prioritizing land
allocation to local communities, 7% arguing for gender equity where men and women
can both inherit land, with 4% who mention issuing title deeds. Third, a small percentage
(5%) demonstrates ethnic animosity by saying that communities should only be allowed
to own land in their ancestral homes. 4% provide other responses, while 2% don’t know.
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Corruption
78.

A number of corruption scandals have plagued the Coalition government over the past
year, and the PEV public holds straightforward ideas as to how to fight corruption. 62%
suggest law and order responses, with 46% who argue for sacking and prosecuting those
responsible for corruption, with 12% who want to make laws that successfully fight
corruption and 4% who want to create an independent and effective anti-corruption
body. Others believe the solution remains with Kenyan society, with 15% who say the
public must be educated on not paying bribes. Last, some believe addressing underlying
factors of poverty will help to fight corruption, with 7% who want to address
unemployment and poverty. 12% replied with other responses while 4% refused to
answer.

Electoral Reform
79.

Given the dissolution of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and the creation of an
interim electoral body, it is important to measure how much faith respondents hold in an
electoral process.

Chart 6: In your opinion, will a new electoral body be capable of holding free and fair
elections?

Yes No
42%36%

Don't
Know
20%

Refused
to answer
2%

80.

Results from Chart 6 show that the dissolution of the ECK may have been the right first
step towards building public confidence in the electoral process again. A plurality (43%)
are confident that a new electoral body will be capable of holding free and fair elections,
while 37% do not and 20% remain unsure and 2% refused to answer. While a majority of
PEV residents still need to be convinced, the relative balance between those with and
without confidence shows that some progress has been made on this front.
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Youth
81.

Graph 8 mentions the concerns for youths in PEV locales.

Graph 8: What are the main issues that the youth in this area complain about? (aggregate
responses)

50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

82.

48%

19%
9%

6%

6%

4%

3%

2%

2%

1%

Responses provided in Graph 8 show that the main concerns for youths in PEV areas are
by and large livelihood issues, including unemployment (48%), poverty (19%), getting
loans (6%), insecurity (4%), and poor pay (2%). Other concerns are education (9%), drug
abuse (6%), and exclusion from decision-making (3%). 2% provided other responses,
while 1% don’t know.

Prosecutions for PEV
83.

As the survey was conducted, the debate of whether and where to try people charged
with inciting and financing PEV continued. Chart 7 shows results of whether PEV
residents wanted to charge individuals responsible for violence, and if so, whether locally
or internationally.
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Chart 7: Should those individuals responsible for the post-election violence be tried through a
local tribunal in Kenya or should they be tried by the International Criminal Court in the Hague?
Refused to
Shouldn't be
answer
tried Don’t know
1%
9%
4%
Local tribunal
33%

ICC/Hague
53%

84.

A large majority of those citizens most affected by PEV are in favor of prosecution (86%).
A majority support action taken by the international community through the Hague
(53%), while a third (33%) prefer trying suspects locally. Only 9% think the accused
should not be tried. 4% don’t know and 1% refused to answer.

85.

We asked a follow-up question probing why respondents preferred the Hague or a local
tribunal. In support of the Hague, 15% think local tribunals are too corruption, 12% think
there will be fair judgments for all at the ICC, 4% say there is no justice in a local tribunal
while another 4% have no confidence in local courts and the same percentage think the
accused would not be able to bribe their way out of the Hague. In support of local
tribunals, 10% think it is a Kenyan affair, 5% believe a local tribunal has the power to
prosecute, and 5% want to allow witnesses to testify. 29% gave “other” responses.

86.

While respondents demonstrate in support of prosecutions, we asked what would
happen in local communities if leaders from those communities were put on trail.
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Graph 9: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election
violence, how do you think people in your community will react?

87.

A third of respondents (33%) believe that their fellow community members would
support such a trail, even against local political leaders. However, a majority (58%)
believe that such actions could incite demonstrations (26%), violence against other
communities (18%), and threats against other communities (14%). 5% don’t know, 2%
provided other responses, and 2% refused to answer. Overall, most citizens in PEV areas
do not have good perceptions of how they think their others from their community will
respond to prosecutions, even though the public remains largely in support of such
prosecutions.

88.

People most affected by PEV find an additional benefit towards prosecutions. When
asked whether they think prosecuting individuals for PEV now will prevent violence in
Kenya’s next general election, 58% think it will while 36% do not. 4% are unsure, and 2%
refused to answer.
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